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1962] RECENT DECISIONS 383 
TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-ACCRUAL OF STATE PROPERTY TAXES 
PAID UNDER PROTEST-During the years 1946 to 1950 a local tax upon 
respondent's real property was assessed at one hundred dollars.1 Respond-
1 The parties, for the purpose of the suit, adopted a simplified example based upon 
an assessment of $100. Actually, hundreds of parcels of property were involved, and 
the amount of the claim was substantial. 
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ent paid the full assessment to avoid interest penalties and seizure and 
sale of the property under tax liens, but contested the assessment in the 
state court, denying any liability greater than eighty-five dollars. In each 
of the preceding years, complying with a private ruling directed to it by 
the Commissioner,2 respondent had deducted the full one hundred dollars, 
and, when in 1951 the tax was fixed by the state court at ninety-five dollars, 
respondent included the five-dollar refund in its gross income. Respondent 
then instituted this action to recover an alleged overpayment of income tax 
in 1951, claiming that ten dollars of the one hundred-dollar deduction taken 
in each year should have been deferred until 1951, and that the five-
dollar refund should be excluded from that year's gross income. The 
district court disagreed with respondent's contentions and accepted the 
view of the Commissioner that the whole amount of the assessed tax ac-
crued, and thus was properly deducted, in the year in which it was paid 
and that the five-dollar refund represented income to the taxpayer in 1951.3 
The Second Circuit reversed on both counts.4 On certiorari, held, affirmed. 
The remittance of the property tax, under protest, was not a type of pay-
ment which would serve to accrue the contested portion of the tax before 
respondent's liability had been determined by the state court. United States 
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 366 U.S. 380 (1961). 
The Court long ago established the rule in United States v. Anderson° 
that all events which ultimately fix a taxpayer's liability for an expense must 
occur before the item can be accrued for deduction purposes. This "all 
events" test uniformly has been held to include taxes.6 And where a tax 
has not been paid and the taxpayer is denying liability for it, most courts 
have not allowed accrual until the year in which the contest is finally 
settled. 7 This result has been reached in accordance with the policy laid 
down by the Court in the Anderson case that a taxpayer should not be 
allowed to accrue an expense and at the same time actively deny liability 
for it. But where, as in the principal case, payment had been made prior 
to the final disposition of a contest involving the determination of liability, 
the decisions were in conflict. The fact of payment and, more importantly, 
the nature of the payment caused much of this difference in opinion. A 
2 Principal case, 366 U.S. 380, 384 n.2 (1961). 
3 Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5837 (S.D.N.Y. 
1959). 
4 Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 279 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1960). 
5 269 U.S. 422 (1926) . 
6 "It is settled by many decisions that a taxpayer may not accrue an expense the 
amount of which is unsettled or the liability for which is contingent, and this principle 
is fully applicable to a ta.x, liability for which the taxpayer denies, and payment whereof 
he is contesting." Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 284 (1944). 
7 See, e.g., Dixie Pine Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516 (1944) ; Security 
Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944). 
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tentative payment may be made in several situations. It may be required 
as a suspense account deposit, as a prerequisite to appeal8 or, as in the 
principal case, it may be induced by a desire to avoid interest penalties. 
These might be called conditional payments. The critical factor in a 
conditional payment is that the taxpayer intends, at the time of payment, 
later to contest his liability for the expense item. On the other hand, a 
truly unconditional payment might be made wherein a taxpayer pays an 
item with an honest belief in his liability for the full amount only to find 
later that he may have been over-assessed. 
In the cases involving conditional payments it had been repeatedly held, 
contrary to the view in the principal case, that such a remittance acts to 
accrue the expense at the time of payment.9 The Court of Claims in a 
leading decision said that accrual may precede payment, but will not 
survive it.10 This rule was followed in an earlier Consolidated Edison deci-
sion,11 involving essentially the same facts as those in the present case. The 
fact that this earlier decision was directly opposed to the holding on appeal 
in the present case surely influenced the Court to grant certiorari in order 
to resolve the conflict. 
In the principal decision, the Court laid heavy emphasis upon the word 
"payment." Read strictly, the holding was simply that a payment made 
with a concurrent intention to contest the liability would not be enough to 
accrue the expense. But the Court did not decide when accrual would 
occur in the case of a truly unconditional payment followed by a later 
decision to contest the liability.12 Such a question becomes important when 
considered in the light of the significance to the taxpayer of proper timing 
of his deductions. In the present case it was advantageous for the tax-
payer to take the deduction in the later year because of excess profits tax 
rates. However, this was an unusual situation. Normally, because of the 
flat tax rate applicable to corporations, deferral of the deduction will not 
result in a tax saving and the corporate taxpayer will desire to take the 
deduction at the earliest possible time. On the other hand, an individual 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Texas Mexican Ry., 263 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1959); Rose v. 
United States, 256 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1958). 
9 See, e.g., Guantanamo &: W.R.R., 31 T.C. 842 (1959); Lehigh Valley R.R., 12 T.C. 
977 (1949). 
10 Chestnut Sec. Co. v. United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 489, 494-95, 62 F. Supp. 574, 576 
(1945) • See G.C.M. 25298, 1947-2 CuM. BULL. 39. 
11 Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 376, 135 F. Supp. 881 (1955) , 
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956). 
12 Such a determination was not necessary to the Court's decision. The Court 
incidentally mentioned the problem, saying: "Of course, an unconditional 'payment•· 
made by a taxpayer in apparent 'satisfaction' of an asserted matured tax liability is, 
without more, plain and persuasive evidence, at least against the taxpayer, that 'all the 
events [have] occur[red] which fix the amount of the tax and determine the liability o£ 
the taxpayer to pay it' ••• :• Principal case at 391. . 
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taxpayer, subject to the progressive rate structure, is often able to effect a 
substantial tax saving by deferring or accelerating deductions to a year of 
higher profits. 
Although few cases have reached the courts in which there has been a 
truly unconditional payment, at least one case has directly held that an 
unconditional payment of a tax does not accrue the expense if the liability 
is later contested.13 In that case the court rejected the theory that a payment 
amounts to an admission of liability, and thus accrues the expense. The 
court felt that there should be no distinction between an unconditional 
payment and one which is made with a concurrent intention to contest the 
liability; that neither should operate to accrue the expense before determi-
nation of the contest. This amounts to a significant extension of the "all 
events" test which the court attempted to justify on the ground that the 
point in time at which the taxpayer forms an intention to contest the lia-
bility is not important. The view that an unconditional payment, followed 
by a later decision to contest the liability, does not accrue an expense re-
quires a broad interpretation of the holding in the principal case. Whether 
such an extension of the "all events" test is justifiable might well tum on the 
significance of two factors: the fundamental policy consideration under-
lying the "all events" test, and the problem of difficulty of proof with 
regard to good faith. 
The "all events" test rests upon the premise that a taxpayer should not 
be allowed to accrue an expense item and take a deduction for it when at 
the same time he is loudly protesting in a court of law that he does not in 
fact owe it. But if the test is extended to the point where a decision to 
contest the liability, made after an unconditional payment, will re-open 
and postpone an earlier accrual, a situation arises which is in discord with 
that very premise. Upon making such an unconditional payment the tax-
payer would have accrued the expense and taken the deduction for it, 
since all the events which fix the liability would ostensibly have occurred. 
But, if in a later year the taxpayer decided to contest his liability for the 
expense, he would be permitted, and indeed required, to re-open the return 
of the earlier year and postpone the deduction, thus canceling the accrual 
effect of what had originally been an unconditional admission of liability. 
This is the very type of inconsistent conduct which the "all events" test 
seeks to prevent. 
The question of the taxpayer's good faith presents a second problem. 
If the court holds that an unconditional payment with a subsequent 
decision to contest requires a re-opening and postponement of the earlier 
accrual, a taxpayer might try to postpone a disproportionately large amount 
13 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1688 (N.D. Ohio 1956). 
Cf. Pierce Estates v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1952); Cooperstown Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 144 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 772 (1944). 
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to the later year. Since deduction of the entire contested amount would 
be postponed, a dishonest taxpayer could increase the size of this deduc-
tion by merely over-asserting his claim when contesting the liability. But 
the question of good faith does not end here. What if the taxpayer were 
to make what appears to be an unconditional payment, while in reality he 
intends full well to contest the expense? If the element of bad faith could 
be proved, the court might well hold that the payment does not accrue 
the expense, on the authority of the principal case. But such proof may 
be very difficult to obtain. Thus, if the court were to hold that a truly un-
conditional payment does accrue the expense, a taxpayer with a valid 
ground for contesting the liability might nevertheless be able to accelerate 
the deduction to an earlier year by making what appears to be an un-
conditional payment. 
Thus, a court is faced with a problem of good faith no matter what 
effect is given to an unconditional payment followed by a later decision to 
contest the liability. A holding that such a payment does not accrue the 
expense may allow the unscrupulous taxpayer to postpone deduction of a 
greater amount than he should, while a holding that such a payment does 
accrue the expense opens up the possibility of a wrongful acceleration of 
the deduction. A clearer ground for resolution of the problem is found 
in the basic policy underlying the "all events" test. And an examination 
of this policy indicates that an unconditional payment, even though fol-
lowed by a later decision to contest the liability, should nevertheless accrue 
the expense. 
Robert L. Harmon 
